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Abstract  
 
Based on the compilation of Uruguayan department-level data, this paper 
argues that the extent of fiscal commitment to primary education during the 
first half of the 20th century can be explained by the interests of tactically 
motivated politicians. The empirical test relies on panel data fixed effects 
models covering 18 Uruguayan departments over 40 years. The main 
findings reveal that political motivations have had a significant role in 
schooling provision across the territory. Throughout the period, the 
incumbent government seems to have used the resource allocation in 
primary education both to reward its core supporters and to persuade 
political opponents.  
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Introduction  
 
The expansion of public primary education across the newly independent world was crucial in 
the development of modern states since the late 19th century. It was one of the first signs of a 
social relationship between state and masses and key to foster socialization and nation-
building (Ansell and Lindvall, 2013). Besides, it played an essential role to provide the labour 
force with the new skills and values needed to make economies competitive in a world rapidly 
becoming more integrated. 
 
Among the factors affecting public schooling provision, the economic history literature has 
posed inequality as one of the most important. In the case of Latin America, several scholars 
have stated that the high degree of landownership concentration would have delayed the 
implementation of public primary schooling in the region, leading to inequality in the 
distribution of human capital and slowing economic growth (Coastworth, 1993; Engerman 
and Sokoloff, 2000, Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000). A similar argument has been put forward for 
US and Europe (Galor et al. 2009; Cinnirella and Hornung, 2013; Beltrán and Martínez, 2015; 
Goñi, 2016) and explored in combination with other aspects of the economic power of elites in 
several developing regions (Martinez Fritscher et al., 2010; Chaudhary et al., 2012). 
 
Research dealing with the influence of political regimes and political actors has associated the 
spread of mass schooling to the extension of voting franchise (Lindert, 2004; Go and Lindert, 
2010; Cappelli, 2016; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2001; Arroyo, 2016); the active role of some 
erudite elites (Gao, 2015) and democracy (De la Croix and Doepke; 2009; Gallego, 2010; 
Stasavage, 2005). This paper contributes to this strand of literature by making focus on the 
role of political competition. It argues that the extent of fiscal commitment to primary 
education might be explained by the interests of tactically motivated politicians. The 
hypothesis is explored for the case of Uruguay over the years 1914-1954, when a second leap 
in primary education development took place, following the foundational one at the last 
quarter of the 19th century. The chosen period allows taking advantage of the availability of 
the first reliable electoral data at the department level (especially after 1918) and it closes on 
the verge of the serious economic and political conflicts that characterized the 1960s (Caetano 
and Rilla, 1996).  
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The analysis frames into the “pork barrel” or “distributive politics” models that posit that 
government can allocate public resources seeking either to obtain a greater political support 
or to avoid losing it (Cox, 2009; Golden and Min, 2013). Though originally developed for the 
US, nowadays there is a wide array of empirical evidence about pork barrel politics in 
different countries. Some studies find distributive strategies favouring core districts and 
underline the role of powerful senior figures within government to get pork (Levitt and 
Snyder, 1995; Milligan and Smart, 2005; Golden and Picci, 2008). Others uncover marginal- or 
swing-district targeting (Denemark, 2000; Case 2001; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Veiga 
and Pinho, 2007, Castells and Solé, 2005).1 The research often focuses on infrastructure 
expenditure or general government grants towards municipalities or provinces. Public 
education spending has not received much attention. The study by Vaishnav and Sicar (2010) 
is one rare example: they study public school construction in a southern Indian state.2  
 
So far, from the perspective of economic history, few studies have examined pork-barrel 
politics. A pioneer one is Wright’s research-work on the distribution of New Deal resources 
between Western and Southern US states, based on the swing-voter hypothesis (Wright, 
1974), which was revised in Wallis (1998). More recently, Curto et al. (2012) explored the 
effect of government and member of Parliament (MPs) strategies on the allocation of public 
funds for roads during the Spanish Restoration (1880-1914). However, the onset of education 
provision has not been considered from this perspective in historical research. 
 
This paper contributes to this literature by evaluating whether the Uruguayan ruling parties 
have weighed their political strengths across regions when distributing funds to mass 
education. Moreover, from a domestic perspective, it provides new quantitative insights to 
complement the local historical qualitative research on the subject and also to understand 
Uruguayan regional development in historical perspective (García et al., 2015; Martínez et al., 
2015). From a more general perspective, the present research might serve to identify new 
sources of the traditionally claimed backwardness and low quality of primary education 
                                                          
1 For an extensive compilation of results, see Golden and Min (2013), who revise more than 150 studies 
of distributive politics in countries other than the United States.  
2 An alternative approach is provided by the “power resource theory”, which deals with other features 
of the partisan composition of governments, such as ideology and the potential influence of left or right 
wing parties or party families on education spending. See Garritzmann and Seng (2016) for a revision 
of the available literature. 
4 
 
systems consolidated by the mid-20th century in the Latin American region (Frankema, 2009; 
Lindert, 2010).   
 
The empirical assessment is based on panel data fixed effects analysis using department-level 
data of the number of available schools (as a proxy of public spending in school provision), 
electoral results and legislative composition. The discussion includes 18 departments out of a 
total of 19. It excludes Montevideo, where the capital city is situated, because of its urban 
primacy and particular schooling structure, which makes it an extreme outlier when 
compared to the rest of the country.  
 
Several reasons make Uruguay an interesting example to understand the relationship 
between politics and primary schooling diffusion. First, the early social preeminence of state 
in the country took place under a competitive party-system. In European societies, social 
protection laws and secular and free education stemmed from the development of an 
industrial society and a class compromise. Instead, in Uruguay it was the political elite, 
through state, that promoted the creation of a modern society. The so-called “traditional 
parties” were the tool with which the state intermediated between the interests of diverse 
social groups (Filgueira, 1995). Second, the action of governments has been influenced not 
only by the compromises between two strong political parties, but most importantly among 
their fractions. In fact, the Parliament activities were pervaded by continuous trade-offs to 
induce cooperation between the executive and the legislature (Lanzaro, 2004; Yaffé et al., 
2004). Thus, according to previous research for the period 1920-2000, political 
fragmentation, legislative composition and the proximity of electoral years have entailed 
significant changes in fiscal and monetary variables, particularly since the mid-fifties (Aboal 
and Calvo, 2000; Aboal et al., 2003a; 2003b; Oddone, 2005). 
 
Third, historians and other social scientists have reported that the partisan channeling of 
public resources was very distinct in the allocation of funds to social services such as 
pensions, labour and family protection or health (Zurbriggen, 2005). However, education has 
been claimed to be the most universal piece of the public social system, and it is usually 
assumed that the different ideological and political views were equally committed to its 
development (Filgueira, 1995). But, being public schools a visible part of a community’s 
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infrastructure, why would the ruling elites have restrained the impulse to use the allocation of 
public education resources to their own advantage?  
 
The findings of this paper reveal that political motivations have had a significant role in 
schooling provision across the territory. During a first phase, the incumbent government has 
used the resource allocation in primary education to reward its core supporters. However, 
from 1934 to 1954 the strategy has been to persuade political opponents. This coincides with 
times of higher political conflict and bargaining. Together with political motivations, the 
expansion of primary education was also favored by the extension of political voice and an 
increasing share of tertiary labor market activities. In contrast, social and wealth inequality 
adversely affected school provision, even in the self-conceived “highly egalitarian” Uruguayan 
society. 
 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the 
expansion of primary education in Uruguay. Section 3 is a review of the main characteristics 
of the Uruguayan political system which would have led to pork barrel tactics. Section 4 
explains the data and empirical approach and section 5 provides the main results. Section 6 
concludes.  
2. The expansion of public primary education in Uruguay (1914-
1954) 
 
As happened in other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica, 
primary schooling expanded substantially in Uruguay since the end of the 19th century 
(Thorp, 1998). The Uruguayan system emerged and grew under the directives of the 
“Education Reform” led by J.P Varela during L. Latorre’s dictatorial government (1876-1879). 
The project was conceived as a powerful tool to fight barbarism and spread liberal values 
across the national territory. In Varela’s words, “…primary school (…) mainly aims at 
developing all [people’s] capacities and forces, to furnish them with health, strength and 
aptitudes to put them into action… the knowledge acquisition remains second” (Varela, 1874).  
 
Ever since Varela’s reform, its principles became generally accepted in the country, where 
people continued to consider the development of a liberal and egalitarian culture as the 
principal objective of basic education (MEC, 2014). The consolidation of this idea was also the 
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merit of the reformist Colorado leader J. Batlle, who was President in two occasions (1903-
1907 and 1911-1916) and left a permanent mark not only in his party but mainly in the 
Uruguayan society.3 Hence, the Varelian principles of free and compulsory schooling (since 
1877) were extended to secondary and tertiary education in 1916. The public school system, 
that had started being operated by secular authorities in the late 19th century, achieved its 
complete secularization in 1909. In addition, the “Education Reform” and the further Batlle’s 
policies made great headway in the professionalization of teaching, the creation of 
infrastructure and the induction of parents to get their children into the education system 
(Bralich, 2011). As a result of this founding period, more than 2/3 of the population aged 15 
and older was literate by 1930 (Lee and Lee, 2016 see Table A.1 in the Appendix).  
 
Different from what happened in US and Europe, the origins of public school expansion in 
Uruguay were not part of a movement of democratization. It was the head of government, 
representing strongly liberal and anticlerical parties, who pushed the reforms. This was also 
the case in Argentina and Chile (Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000), Brazil (Martinez Fritscher et al., 
2010) and Peru (Arroyo, 2016). Hence, electoral reforms did not precede the expansion in 
public funded schools. Instead, the latter was seen as key to foster men’s participation in 
democracy. In fact, until the 1918 Constitution suffrage was only granted to male citizens 
meeting wealth and literacy requirements. And schooling expansion was actually a demand by 
the landholding elites, eager to fight barbarism and civilize masses in order to transform them 
into a disciplined labour force thanks partially to the fact that school funding did not require 
any special payment (Bralich, 2011).  
 
Schooling, like the rest of government services, was centrally financed and organized. The 
same happened with the system of fiscal revenues. The growing financial needs of the primary 
education system were initially covered by funds coming from different tax sources: 
percentages of taxes on renting, inheritance, trade authorizations, motorcars, various types of 
basic consumption goods (foodstuff, clothes, etc). The 1934 Constitution changed this system 
and removed the fixed percentages. Since then, education funding, together with all other 
                                                          
3 Batlle’s government established a welfare state system in the country within which the intermediate 
education for women, industrial training and the expansion of secondary education played a central 
role (Lindhal, 1977). 
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items of the national budget, had to be funded by the proceeds of total government revenues 
(Anselmi and Zaffaroni, 1941).  
 
Within this framework, politicians’ incentives to spend on primary education during the 
period depended on their perception about its benefits, as well as on the availability of fiscal 
resources.  World War I put an end to a period of dynamic export-led growth, damaging the 
central source of government revenues (foreign trade taxes). However, government 
expenditure could recover during the 1920s and up to the 1929 crisis sudden stop increased 
from 7% of total GDP in 1918 to 11% in 1931.  After the mid 1930s, public outlays remained 
rather stable until the end of the period.  Under these budget constraints the expenditure 
share of primary education raised modestly, from 5.3% in 1914 to 7.4% in 1954 (Azar et al., 
2009). Its highest levels were reached during the 1920s, particularly from 1924 to 1930, 
when primary education captured (on average) 9% of the total budget.4  
 
Figure 1 shows two phases in the evolution of the primary education expenditure share. From 
1917 to 1931 it expanded over a growing public budget. After 1931, both ratios remained 
rather constant. On the other hand, along with the expanding funding, the provision of schools 
clearly increased since 1914, after the early jumps in 1905 and 1911, under Batlle’s 
government. Figure 2 shows that the series jumps in 1924 and keeps on slowly rising until the 
mid-1950s. By the end of the period, it had increased almost 80%. Accordingly, the number of 
teachers more than doubled, and the percentage of primary enrolment grew steadily from an 
estimated 29% in 1914 to almost 57% in 1954 (DGEa and DGEb, Table A.1).  
 
  
                                                          
4 This orientation was supported by a law dated in October 1926 that modified the percentages of tax 
revenues devoted to primary schooling and widened the range of tax sources applied to this end 
(Acevedo, 1936).  
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Figure 1. Central Government and primary schooling expenditure shares  
 
 
Source: Azar et al. (2009) 
 
Figure 2. Total number of schools in the country 
 
Source: Based on DGEa (Table A.1) 
 
 
Traditionally public funding has favoured the South (close to Montevideo and the River Plate) 
and the West (the Uruguay River coastline), which were also regions with high income and 
welfare indicators..5 By contrast, lower funds have corresponded to the Northern and Eastern 
regions (by the Brazilian border), which have been described as a poor periphery, with the 
lowest records in terms of income per capita, infrastructure and social welfare.6 The central 
areas of the country were in an intermediate position (García et al., 2015; Lombardi and Veiga, 
1979). Figure 3 shows however, that during the period the increase in the number of schools 
was general, and not concentrated in the richest part of the country or Montevideo. In fact, 
                                                          
5  This region includes the departments of San José, Colonia, Soriano, Río Negro and Paysandú.   
6 The poorest departments have been Artigas, Rivera, Cerro Largo, Treinta y Tres and Tacuarembó. 
During the period, also Canelones was in the group.  
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some of the poorest departments, such as Tacuarembó and Rivera, were among those in 
which the number of schools grew more between 1914 and 1954. In fact, one relevant feature 
of the period is that along with the relevance of the capital-city government also raised its 
interest in the rest of the country.7  
 
Figure 3. Change in the number of public schools across departments (1914-1954) 
 
Source: Based on DGEa (Table A.1) 
 
Table 1 presents some indicators of primary school development at the department level, as 
averages for the period 1914-1954. It confirms the variability of situations across the country 
and, specifically, the distinctive features of Montevideo. The latter concentrated 10% of the 
country’s public funded schools and 60% of the private ones during the period. As a result, the 
ratio of private over public schools was 70% in Montevideo and 6% in the rest of the country. 
This justifies the exclusion of Montevideo from our analysis, as well as the focus on the rest of 
departments, where the public system emerged as the almost exclusive supplier. In this 
context, this study argues that if public funds were crucial to guarantee access to primary 
education in the different departments (except for Montevideo) their relevance might have 
turned them into an opportunity for political manipulation.  
  
                                                          
7 The idea that Montevideo had already established a proper schooling system under the Varelian 
Reform and the first Batllist presidency, seemed to have lain behind this orientation (MEC, 2014). 
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Table 1. Public primary education indicators by department (average 1914-1954) 
Department Primary enrolment/schools 
Primary enrolment/ 
teacher 
 School area/pupils 
(m2)* 
Artigas 78.4 41.6  1.34 
Canelones 96.0 43.6  1.59 
Cerro Largo 75.3 41.4  1.62 
Colonia 93.5 41.8  1.48 
Durazno 87.4 43.6  1.29 
Florida 85.4 41.4  1.42 
Flores 74.4 35.2  1.57 
Lavalleja 84.5 42.8  1.27 
Maldonado 84.2 40.3  1.28 
Montevideo 349.6 36.0  1.11 
Paysandú 93.0 39.3  1.23 
Rivera 100.7 46.5  1.28 
Río Negro 92.4 41.7  1.47 
Rocha 87.5 42.3  1.31 
Salto  102.8 42.4  1.25 
San José  81.9 39.6  1.35 
Soriano  90.3 41.3  1.29 
Tacuarembó  87.9 43.6  1.33 
Treinta y Tres 77.5 41.7  1.54 
Total 101.2 41.4  1.37 
*Data available only for 12 years in the period 1914-1945. CIDE established that the target value 
of the ratio school area/pupils should be 1.5 m2. 
Source: own computation based on DGEa (Table A.2) 
 
So far, this picture about the dynamics of public school expansion reveals just a part of the 
story. According to several studies, at the end of the 1950s, the minimal conditions to secure 
an adequate educational performance were not provided, yet. The increase in infrastructure 
and current expenses was not enough to keep up with enrolment and to retain pupils into the 
system. Grade repetition, high drop-out rates and late enrolment were among the most 
important concerns (Otero, 1969; CIDE, 1965).8 By 1963, 15% of people over 30 years old 
were illiterate and less than 40% of adult population and 47% of labour force had completed 
primary education (Otero, 1969). Actually, as in Argentina and Chile, it took at least until the 
1970s to achieve acceptable levels of grade promotion and school completion after having 
achieved full primary school enrolment rates (Frankema, 2009; Bértola and Bertoni, 1999).  
 
                                                          
8 CIDE stands for “Comisión de Inversión y Desarrollo Económico” (Commission for Investment and 
Economic Development).  
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From a comparative perspective, the country shares with its regional counterparts the failure 
to invest enough in public education at least until the 1930s, during the intense growth period 
associated to primary export expansion. Table 2 contains the average level of public primary 
education spending (as a proportion of GDP) for some middle and high income countries in 
1914 and 1950. Uruguay does not stand out by the level of their public resources devoted to 
public education.  
 
Table 2. Public primary education expenditure in selected countries (% GDP) 
Countries 1914 1950 
Chile 0.89 1.05 
France 1.48 1.23 
Japan 2.04 1.78 
Spain 0.41 0.38 
United Kingdom 0.98 0.91 
United States 2.33 2.10 
Uruguay 0.71 0.85 
Total 1.35 1.24 
Source: own computation based on UC Davis (Table A.4.1); Azar et al. 
(2009).  
3. A look at Uruguayan politics  
 
The present analysis aims to assess whether the incumbent government used school 
provision to persuade the electorate and, particularly, to reinforce its legislative outcomes. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the degree of influence of political parties on the 
government’s decision making process in Uruguay during the period. The pork-barrel politics 
literature provides some clues to understand the Uruguayan case.  
 
Two main theoretical models account for distortions in resource allocation. Lindbeck and 
Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1998) show that the incumbent purchases votes by 
distributing money to regions in which there are many “swing voters” (those not specifically 
attached to any party) and low-income voters (cheaper to attract). Instead, Cox and 
McCubbins (1986) state that due to risk aversion, the incumbent government purchases votes 
by investing in districts where it already has high support.  
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This line of “electoral targeting” might be combined with a “legislative targeting”, as it 
happens when the distribution of benefits aims at optimizing legislative outcomes. The reason 
is that after the elections, legislative seats become more important than popular votes. Then, 
benefits could flow to senior figures in the governing coalition (as with “core” voters) or to 
pivotal legislators (the analogs of “swing” voters) whose support may be crucial in 
overcoming majority requirements in the legislative process (Cox, 2009). As a result, 
distributive benefits may be directed to persuade electorate as well as to bargain intermediate 
legislative outcomes, even with legislators belonging to the president’s own party (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986; Evans, 2004). On the other hand, this dynamics would also reflect the 
higher ability or skills of certain senior representatives to attract resources to their 
constituencies. As it is shown below, this is the situation that most resembles the Uruguayan 
case.  
 
The Republic adopted a presidential system and a bicameral organization of the legislative 
since its inception in 1830. Later, the 1918 Constitution laid the foundation of a real 
democratic system. It established universal, direct and secret ballot for all male-citizens and 
removed any requirement to be elector or elected.9 It also introduced Proportional 
Representation (PR) and established a National Administration Council (NAC). Composed by 9 
members (6 from the winning Party and 3 from the major opposition party), the NAC would 
share the Executive Power with the President. They would be renewed by thirds every 2 
years. The elected president would rule during 4 years and hold the Military power, the 
Internal Order responsibilities and the country’s international representation. The NAC would 
be in charge of the economy and the rest of domestic policy decisions. NAC members were 
elected independently from the President and its Chief could belong to a different fraction or 
even a different party.  
 
This state of affairs lasted until the 1933 coup d’etat, which aligned some members of the 
Colorado Party with the majority of the National party, both seeking changes in the prevailing 
orientation of the Uruguayan social and economic system. The de facto government pushed 
the creation of a Constitutional Assembly to write down a new Constitution, approved in 
1934. It was a mixture of liberalism, corporatism and statism and would influence the main 
                                                          
9 These new regulations came into force in 1923. The Constitution also stated that women’s citizenship 
rights could be granted by law. This happened in 1932. 
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aspects of the country’s public policy for the next 40 years (Filgueira, 1995). The new regime 
did not suspend national elections, which were held in 1934 and 1938, though they were 
boycotted by important political fractions.10  
 
The 1934 Constitution removed the NAC, and established that PR would not be applied to the 
Senate. Since then, the total number of Senators would be equally divided between the 
election winner and the major opposition party.11 It also introduced the compulsory vote 
(though without sanctions), eliminated any difference in political rights of men and women 
and established that legislatures and executives would be elected at once, every 4 years. These 
rules would again be revised by the 1951 Constitutional Reform, which brought back a 
collegial Executive Power since 1952: the National Government Council. It counted on the 
joint participation of the two main political parties and was in force until 1967. 
 
One long-lasting and fundamental principle common to all the electoral regulations since 
1910 has been the “double simultaneous vote” (DSV). From 1934 onwards it has been applied 
to the election of all public officials (legislative and executive, at the national and local level). 
The DVS implies that voters had the power to choose from different lists within their 
preferred party: they choose the party as well as a specific group of politicians within it, all at 
the same time. As a result, the electoral rule could produce a winner who had not won the 
total popular vote but the majority support within the winning party (Altman et al, 2011; 
Piñeiro, 2004). Similarly, a legislative majority of the president’s party did not necessarily 
correspond with the preeminence of his political fraction.   
 
The collegiate reforms, the PR and the DVS set up strong incentives for party cooperation. 
Certainly, since the 19th century the Uruguayan history has evolved around the ups-and 
downs of the two strong and statewide parties: the Colorado and the Nationalist. The 
Colorado party dominated the political arena until 1959. They were liberal, anticlerical and 
tied to urban areas. Instead, the Nationalists have been more conservative and more clearly 
linked to rural interests. Beyond these general features, differences in ideological background 
or social composition were negligible and each of those two parties was supported by ca. one -
                                                          
10 Mainly, the Colorado Batllists and the Independent Nationalists, who emerged from an internal 
division of the National Party. 
11 This reform has been historically known as the “half-half Senate” or “senado de medio y medio” and 
was in force until 1942. 
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half of the total electors (Zurbriggen, 2005; González, 1990). Indeed, some intraparty 
ideological differences could be more significant than interparty ones. Other parties, such as 
Comunists, Socialists, or Christian ones had a minority presence until the 1960s. 
 
The DVS contributed both to create and to organize the so-called “fractionalized bipartism” 
(Buquet et al., 1998). Both major parties have been riven by policy disputes which made 
fractions highly visible. These could even be considered as “parties inside parties” (Lindahl, 
1977). The Colorados have been divided into batllists and riverists (opposed to the social and 
economic proposals of President Batlle).12 Besides, since 1917 batllists themselves split 
according to the loyalty to different leaders, situation that got worse after Batlle passed away 
in 1929. The Nationalists suffered divisions since 1930 due to personal disputes between the 
most conservative party-leader (L. A. de Herrera) and their opponents (later gathered under 
the Independent Nationalists).  
 
The impact of the two-party system on electoral competition led to closely disputed results. 
Uruguay has 19 electoral districts, which coincide with the departments, and vary 
considerably in the number of representatives (from 2 to 32 or 45 depending on the year). 
Montevideo (excluded from the analysis) had 30 to 40% of total representation, so it was 
crucial in the electoral dispute. Nonetheless, given the narrow vote margins and the serious 
intraparty divisions, the rest of constituencies also became crucial for the electoral 
competition and post-electoral alliances.  
 
Table 3 indicates the electoral occasions in which the vote margin between the main parties 
was lower than 10% at each constituency. It reveals that during the period, along with strong 
party loyalties, politics moved in narrow margins in the majority of departments, with the 
exception of Artigas, Maldonado and Rivera. 
  
                                                          
12 The “riverist” fraction takes its name from the Colorado leader Fructuoso Rivera, first constitutional 
President of the Republic (1830-1834).  
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Table 3. Presence of vote margin under 10% across departments and elections 
Departments 
Legislative Elections 
1916 1925 1928 1931 1934 1938 1942 1946 1950 1954 
Artigas 
          Canelones yes 
 
yes 
       Cerro Largo 
    
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Colonia yes yes 
 
yes 
     
yes 
Durazno yes 
   
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 Flores 
   
yes 
  
yes 
 
yes 
 Florida 
 
yes 
  
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 Lavalleja yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Maldonado 
          Paysandú yes yes yes yes yes 
    
yes 
Río Negro 
 
yes 
 
yes yes yes 
   
yes 
Rivera 
          Rocha yes yes yes yes 
     
yes 
Salto 
  
yes yes 
      San José 
     
yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Soriano yes 
 
yes yes 
   
yes 
 
yes 
Tacuarembó yes yes yes yes yes yes 
    Treinta y Tres 
    
yes yes 
 
yes yes 
 
Source: own compilation based on Nahum (2007), Nohlen (1993), FSS and Acevedo (Table A.4.1) 
 
Consequently, the Colorados, though being the dominant party, never obtained 3 consecutive 
majorities in the low Chamber during the period 1918-1933 and only gained one absolute 
majority (1946) between 1942 and 1954. On the other hand, the high levels of intraparty 
indiscipline, splits and personality disputes were translated into dissent, bargains and deals 
among the parliamentary representatives. As a result, coalition partners in the legislative 
arena changed frequently during government terms. Still, it is true that no matter how close 
they were, no fraction from one party would have moved to the opponent party (Altman et al, 
2011). The same happened to a considerable number of voters who were firmly attached to 
their party and whose support was out of reach for the other.  
 
Ultimately, the levels of cooperation and compromise among fractions benefited the working 
of Parliament by smoothing the decision-making processes and the levels of confrontation 
and conflict (Caetano and Rilla, 1996). They also brought significant benefits for politicians in 
terms of patronage and clientelism. These became visible during the 1930s, got worse in the 
1940s and reached a maximum in the 1950s, as fraction proliferation increased (Filgueira, 
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1995, Real de Azúa, 1964). Such was the case that the 1934 Constitution made explicit that 
“civil servants should serve the nation not the political fractions” (Zurbriggen, 2005: 130).13  
 
The current study explores primary education spending, which was funded by the central 
government and disbursed across departments. The role of Parliament was essential, because 
the national budget was discussed, approved and controlled by the legislative representatives. 
The present analysis is based on the performance of the members of the low chamber 
(Diputados): they were regulated by the same electoral rules and appointed following a 
regional proportional representation during the whole period. Moreover, some scholars 
consider that diputados reflect more clearly the high degree of fragmentation of the partisan 
politics and the relationship with the electorate, being much more responsive to their 
demands (Monestier, 1999; Buquet, 2003). In addition, as described above, during the period 
under study the president lacked a strong legislative power and was subject to continuous 
political bargain at the parliamentary arena. 
4. Empirical approach 
 
The empirical analysis is built upon a department-level historical dataset for 18 territorial 
units for the period 1914-1954. This regional approach had to overcome some data 
constraints. This is the case of the main outcome variable: public education spending per 
region is not available for the selected time-span. For this reason, public financial efforts are 
measured through the number of available schools at each department.  This variable stands 
as a proxy for the public resources applied to the current operation of the primary education 
system across regions (Arroyo, 2016; Gao, 2015; Chaudhary, 2009). Despite being an indirect 
measure it is suitable since department heterogeneities in terms of school equipment did not 
seem to be wide according to Table 1. Besides, the rapid primary education expansion was 
mainly covered by renting private buildings (they represented over 70% of establishments), 
not by school construction. This reduces the importance of potential regional disparities in 
public infrastructure investment. As a robustness check, we also use the number of teachers 
hired by public schools as an alternative dependent variable. In all cases, data come from 
several National Statistics Yearbooks of the years covered by the study (DGEa in Table A.1). 
 
                                                          
13 Article 57 of the 1934 Constitution.  
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The period comprises 12 legislative terms which lasted 3 years until the 1934 Constitution 
and 4 years from then onwards. We study the political orientation of the diputados elected in 
representation of the different departments. Their total number (including Montevideo) 
changed from 90 (until 1916) to 123 (between 1917 and 1932) and finally ranged 99 since 
1934. Each department elected at least 2 representatives, which made up a total sample of 70 
deputies per election in the 18 departments (Montevideo excluded).  
 
Data on the name, party affiliation, legislative term and department of origin of each one of 
the legislators have been extracted from the report “Parlamentarios uruguayos 1830-2005” 
edited by the Uruguayan Parliament (2006). However, this source does not identify political 
fractions. From 1925 to 1943 this has been re-constructed on the basis of the electoral ballots 
of each party by department and election published on line by the Uruguayan Electoral Office. 
The gaps for the rest of the period have been completed with data on elections and parties 
compiled by the area of Political Sciences of the FSS Databank, Nahum (2007) and Acevedo 
(1936).  
 
This dataset allows computing the main political indicators to be assessed in the study. As 
discussed in the previous section, political priorities might affected spending decisions 
depending on the intensity of the challenge the incumbent party faced from others and also 
from intraparty fractions. In order to take into account the crucial role played by these 
fractions in local politics, we compute the degree of fragmentation of the party system 
(Laakso and Taafepera, 1979).14 
 
Let ̅ = ∑ 

  be the total number of parliamentary seats and 	 	=  ̅⁄  the shares of the 
seats of party i. Then the 						 = 
∑  ̅⁄ 
 
!"
= #∑ 	
$
 %
&
, 
that is the inverse of the sum of squares shares. An increase in the value of ENP corresponds 
to a reduction in the degree of concentration of the political system. The ENP is simply the 
inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. It measures the level of political concentration, 
where the number of parties in competition is neither dependent on just the largest party’s 
vote (1/s() nor distorted by alterations in the numbers or vote shares of very small parties 
                                                          
14 The measure has reached a high degree of consensus among scholars. Despite the drawbacks 
stressed by some authors suggesting new measures, it remains the most used when assessing the 
party-system fragmentation (Caulier, 2011).  
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(Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). The same computation applies to party fractions (ENF) by 
taking s( 	= x( x*⁄  as the shares of the seats of each political fraction within the party system.  
 
Both, ENP and ENF have been estimated for each one of the departments and legislative 
terms. It is expected that the greater the number of parties or fractions the greater the chances 
presidents will not count with a majority support in the legislature (Shugart and Carey, 1992).  
As previously seen, though the system has produced a fractionalized party scheme, it became 
markedly more so after the democracy recovery in 1938. On average, the NEF was 2.16 
between 1914 and 1930 and rose to an average of 2.85 for the span 1938-1954. 
 
Besides, the distributive politics framework states that government could use schooling 
provision to induce cooperation between the executive and the legislative. Under the 
assumption that the extent up to which the president is compelled to seek legislative support 
hinges upon its legislative power, three variables are used to describe his position in each 
department. First, the “seat margin” is the difference of seats between the government’s party 
and the maximum of those occupied by an opposition party, as a share of the total available 
department seats. It is interpreted as an indicator of electoral competition: the higher the seat 
margin in favour of government, the lower the electoral competition in the department.  
 
The other two indicators explicitly consider the influence of party fractions. The “Government 
Political Power Index” (GPPI) is obtained by multiplying the proportion of seats aligned with 
the president’s party times the share of seats of his political fraction within the party (Aboal et 
al., 2003a; Oddone, 2005). The higher the value of the GPPI the stronger is the president’s 
legislative support. The index has been calculated for each department and legislative term. 
As during the period 1919-1932, the NAC conducted the economy and took the most 
important domestic policy decisions, it is estimated in reference to the NAC’s President.  
 
A second indicator is the share of seats aligned with the president beyond their partisan 
affiliation (over the total elected at each department level). Different from the previous 
measure, this “alignment” variable is allowed to change during the legislative term due to 
coalitions and intraparty conflicts. The required information has been compiled from several 
historical analyses (Acevedo, 1934 and 1936, Zum Felde, 1967; Caetano and Rilla, 1996; 
Nohlen, 1993).   
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A complementary perspective to legislative outcomes focuses on the electoral dispute. In this 
case, the discussion hinges upon the extent up to which the incumbent government has 
preferred to reward its core supporters or to maximize the probability of winning the election 
by allocating resources to swing districts.15 Following Milligan and Smart (2005) and 
Vaishnav and Sicar (2010) the electoral pressures on the ruling party are captured by the 
difference in vote shares between the main party in the central government and its main 
opponent (expressed in absolute values).16 A small difference in this vote margin in the last 
legislative election is assumed to define a “swing” constituency. The necessary data to 
estimate those differences are taken from Nahum (2007), Nohlen (1993), the FSS Databank 
and Acevedo (1936). The variable is not available for the whole period, because there is not 
information about the votes cast by parties at the department level in 3 legislative polls: 1913, 
1919 and 1922.  
 
Apart from political factors, scholars have suggested that an unequal distribution of land 
might slow down the expansion of public schooling (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; 2001; 
Galor et al., 2009). Indeed, Engerman and Sokoloff have stated that Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay invested more in education than their regional counterparts because landownership 
inequality was less pronounced. In order to account for this hypothesis, a land Gini index is 
included in the analysis, which was elaborated by Castro et al. (2012) on the basis of 
information about the size of rural establishments (Table A.1).  
 
Another driver for public schooling investment in Europe and the US has been the extension 
of political franchise or the “political voice” (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000, Lindert, 2004). 
Though in Uruguay, school development preceded democratization, it is relevant to explore 
whether the electorate enlargement has contributed to foster the demand for primary 
schooling.  The size of the potential electorate to be disputed by the parties is measured by the 
ratio of registered electors over total population. The indicator takes into account that literacy 
and wealth vote requirements were effectively removed in 1923 for men aged 18 and over 
and in 1938 for women. Suffrage has been compulsory since then.  
                                                          
15 Golden and Min (2013) state that as studies rely on aggregated data they are really comparing core 
and swing electoral areas or districts rather than core and swing voters, as predicted by the theory. 
16 An alternative indicator is given by the votes needed for the incumbent government to gain/lose the 
majority. Unfortunately, the range of data available at the department level impedes this computation.  
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A group of other covariates aim to proxy the potential demand for public education provision, 
such as average population size and the birth rate at each department. The former has been 
constructed by interpolating the 1908 and 1963 Census data while the second has been built 
upon the total number of births published at several Statistics Yearbooks of the period.17 On 
the other hand, the previous local progress of schooling is given by the primary enrolment 
rate lagged one year (private and public). It was computed from the data on total primary 
enrolled students (DGEa) and an estimation of the primary-school age children at each 
department, proxied by those aged between 5 and 14 years (DGEb in Table A.1). The variable 
captures the preexisting direct demand on schooling.  
 
Other socio-economic variables that could have affected the demand for education (economic 
growth, share of total value added, industrial composition, literacy rates, total years of 
education, etc) are not available at the department level on a yearly basis, so they were 
described through several proxies. For instance, secondary enrolment rates are expected to 
describe the broad educational standards prevailing at the department but also the local 
income level and even its distribution. The argument is that, until the late 1920s, secondary 
education was aimed to prepare students to enter University, so it stood as an exclusive 
domain of economic elites. Though by 1912, there was at least one public secondary school at 
almost each department capital, the real democratization of access started in 1935, when 
secondary institutions were separated from University (MEC, 2014). The variable is taken 
with a 6 year-lag in order to control for the education and income level of 18-24 year-old 
people, who may also be potential parents.  
 
Similarly, the share of private primary enrolment over the total describes the potential trade-
off between public and private education at the department level, probably influenced by the 
preferences of the groups belonging to the higher tail of income distribution. The variable is 
lagged one year. Data come from Nahum (2007), Education Yearbooks and census 
information for the interpolation of secondary school age population.  
 
                                                          
17 One serious data constraint for the period is that population Censuses have only been carried out in 
1908 and then in 1963. The information for the long time span between them comes mainly from 
annual general statistics.    
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The labour force participation rate and the growth rate of the tertiary labour force aims to 
account for each department economic development. It may also reflect the progress of 
urbanization. These variables are expected to exert a positive effect on school provision 
(Lindert, 2004; Mitch, 2013). An additional incentive to foster public education might come 
from skilled labour demand. Following Cappelli (2016), the share of the labour force 
employed in agriculture and in secondary activities (in relation to tertiary activities) is used to 
capture the possible returns to human capital formation, assuming that skilled labour was not 
a prime request in agricultural societies or for the incipient industry. The information on 
labour market has been taken from García et al. (2015) and gaps fulfilled with interpolations.  
 
Finally, the share of school-age children over people aged 55 and older is included to account 
for the potential generational conflict over public resources. If government tries to maximize 
its political support by favouring the allocation of funds towards the elderly, there would be a 
negative effect on school spending (Poterba, 1997; Grob and Walter, 2007). This was a 
plausible situation in the country, because pensions have historically been the main social 
transfers. In fact, the first pension rights were recognized in 1829 and consolidated in 1904: 
before the great mass expansion of public education (Azar et al., 2009). 
 
One limitation of this analytical proposal concerns the treatment of rural schooling, which 
actually led the expansion of schooling throughout the country (MEC, 2014). However, lack of 
data on total and school age rural population and distance to urban centers have prevented 
from focusing on its specific development. Table A.1 summarizes the main data sources and 
Table A.2 reports summary statistics for the baseline variables.  
 
The baseline specification is a panel data fixed effects estimation of the following model:  
 
	ℎ,	- = .- + 01- + 2 + 2- + 3- 
 
where 	ℎ,	- is the number of public schools at each year (t) and department (i); - 
includes the political variables; 1- stands for the set of control variables;	2 are department 
fixed effects, 2- are specific year-effects and 3- is an error term.  
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The model would help to identify the drivers of variations in the number of schools within 
departments over time. The use of department fixed effects controls for unobserved 
characteristics of the departments that are constant over time, such as geographic features or 
differences in rural-urban concentration. Likewise, the year fixed effects capture unobserved 
external changes over time which may produce similar effects across departments, such as 
constraints or expansions in national budget which are centrally decided. On the other hand, 
the potential non-independence of errors within departments is tackled by clustering 
standard errors at the department level.   
 
Dependent and control variables are considered annually. Political factors (except for the 
legislative alignment with the president) are defined for each legislative term, so they are the 
same between elections. The model assumes that the number of schools each year is affected 
by the legislative configuration or the electoral results emerging from the previous election so 
that reverse causality problems are avoided.  
 
5. Results  
 
Table 4 presents the first set of results and summarizes the influence of the political variables 
on schooling provision. Column 1 shows a significant and positive relationship between the 
number of effective fractions and the available schools. So, a highly fragmented political 
system seemed to have fostered education spending at the department level. The variable 
keeps this influence and remains statistically significant across all specifications but one.  
 
Columns 3 to 5 keep the prevailing intraparty competition variable (ENF) and alternatively 
add indicators describing government’s seat margin, political power index (GPPI) and 
alignment of MPs. The coefficients of these three variables are negative and significant at 10% 
level.18 They suggest that lower president’s legislative powers benefited school provision 
across regions. In other words, all else equal, it seems that the incumbent government party 
did not allocate resources to reinforce the strength of its already loyal legislators. Instead, the 
                                                          
18 This level of statistical significance could stem from the fact that the degree of party support to 
government is more difficult to assess as competition among political fractions grows (reflected in the 
highly significant NEF variable).  
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fund distribution appears to have been affected by the government’s need to bargain with 
regional opposition representatives.  
 
To complete this information, Columns 5 and 6 show the effect of the electoral margin on 
schools in order to assess whether public schooling provision was targeted to “core” or 
“swing” constituencies. The variable has a negative sign meaning that a reduction in electoral 
margin between the main parties (that is, a closer electoral dispute) implied an increase in 
school provision. Though suggestive, the coefficient is not significant. Still, this result might be 
affected by the lack of data on 3 elections (1913, 1919 and 1922). Following Milligan and 
Smart (2005), the vote margin has been interacted with a dummy variable indicating 
government held department. This is intended to capture possible differences in case the 
electoral dispute was settled in favour of the president’s party. The effect of margin in 
government loyal departments is obtained from adding this coefficient (positive and non 
significant) to the interacted variable, highly significant and negative. The result is a negative 
sum suggesting that school provision was positively related to swing regions in which 
government has won the electoral dispute. The aim would have probably been to enhance its 
chances of re-election. 
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Table 4.Primary schooling, party competition and government legislative powers 
Dep. Var. Nº of public schools 1 2 3 4 5  6 
Effective Nº Fractions (ENF)  0.974*** 1.062*** 0.909*** 0.953*** 0.809* 0.386 
(0.298) (0.277) (0.310) (0.298) (0.404) (0.392) 
Government Seat Margin  -1.327*   
(0.740)   
Gov. Political Power Index  -1.740*   
(1.029)   
Alignment with President  -1.412*   
(0.811)   
Vote Margin (VM) -1.082 4.527 
(3.902) (3.525) 
VM x Gov.  held prov. (dummy) 
    
 -11.561** 
     
 (5.239) 
Gov. held prov. (dummy)   0.324 
 (1.030) 
Land Gini index -38.723** -39.632*** -41.244*** -38.735** -33.096** -44.496*** 
(14.416) (13.362) (13.571) (13.796) (12.678) (12.012) 
Potential Electorate 18.529* 17.200* 17.884* 18.726* 21.748 21.277 
(9.088) (8.957) (8.956) (9.217) (20.827) (19.438) 
Population (thousands) 0.778*** 0.777*** 0.776*** 0.777*** 0.704*** 0.662*** 
(0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115) (0.163) (0.162) 
Birth rate (per thousands) 0.190** 0.203** 0.195** 0.188** 0.089 0.101 
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.086) (0.085) 
Primary enrolment (lag. 1) 39.942** 41.642** 40.078** 40.456** 29.118* 30.872** 
(15.410) (15.400) (15.348) (15.370) (14.335) (13.586) 
Priv. school stud./total (lag. 1) -43.869*** -43.573** -42.810** -44.773*** -43.770** -38.865* 
(15.092) (15.974) (15.461) (15.216) (19.235) (18.526) 
Secondary enrolment (lag. 6) -57.105* -54.030* -54.823* -55.441* -29.413 -25.377 
(31.969) (28.517) (30.570) (30.941) (37.522) (30.774) 
Labour force participation rate 81.651*** 80.646*** 80.488*** 80.908*** 75.032** 61.079* 
(18.970) (18.748) (18.712) (19.047) (33.697) (29.254) 
Rate of growth of tertiary 
labourers 863.774** 896.029** 863.591** 853.793** 580.488 494.411 
(311.049) (312.200) (320.492) (313.314) (456.283) (437.362) 
Active population in primary 
activities/total -323.386*** -311.354*** -314.579*** -317.729*** -269.849** -246.467** 
(104.135) (101.464) (104.181) (101.710) (103.636) (87.819) 
Active population in secondary 
activities/total -331.148*** -309.160** -322.619*** -326.996*** -274.869** -257.001** 
(110.973) (110.927) (111.194) (106.194) (125.144) (114.024) 
School aged/people over 55 20.788*** 21.142*** 20.680*** 20.752*** 7.873*** 7.687*** 
(5.338) (5.240) (5.345) (5.412) (2.421) (2.454) 
Observations 551 548 549 551 443 443 
R2 0.606 0.610 0.616 0.611 0.694 0.735 
Note: All columns include department and time fixed effects and a constant. A total of 18 departments are considered. Cluster 
robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
What emerges from the results is that school provision during the period seems to have been 
influenced by government political tactics. These were targeted to persuade swing voters (in 
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departments at risk of being lost) or opposition legislators, but not to reward party 
supporters or core constituencies.  
 
Among the control variables, particular attention is given to the land Gini index. As previously 
mentioned, it has been argued that landownership inequality might have had an adverse 
effect on primary schooling expansion. Several authors have obtained evidence on this issue 
by applying an instrumental variable approach to scale down endogeneity problems aroused 
from omitted variables bias and reverse causality (Galor et al, 2009; Cinnirella and Hornung, 
2013).19 Though the estimation performed in this study precludes the discussion of a causality 
relationship, the results do indicate that high levels of land inequality within departments 
were systematically associated with a lower school provision. Therefore, contrary to the 
traditional belief about the relative neutrality of landowners in the process of education 
diffusion, the estimation suggests that they had preferences against public schooling which in 
turn had an effect on the timing of its expansion.  
 
Political voice also affected the commitment to fund schooling across departments. It is 
possible that the ruling elite perceived that school expansion could be in line with the 
interests of the extended electorate and this would have contributed to raise primary public 
schooling. The rest of controls in Table 4 plays an important role in the variation of the 
dependent variable: they yield the expected signs and are statistically significant. Hence, total 
population, birth rates and previous primary enrolment ratios have a positive impact on 
school expansion. In the same vein, a similar effect is found for the labour force participation 
and the growth rate of tertiary labour. This is consistent with the idea that urban regions are 
more prone to demand public education provision.  
 
Another interesting pattern emerges from the negative and significant influence of secondary 
enrolment rates and the ratio of private primary school enrolment over total. They are 
intended to capture the preferences towards public education of people distributed at middle 
and high income levels. The evidence suggests that the interests of those who could afford to 
pay for schooling out of their pocket or had a previous choice in favour of a long educative 
career held back public primary education spending.  
 
                                                          
19 A variable correlated both with landownership and schooling would bias the results. This is the case 
of the quality of institutions (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000).  
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Besides, different occupational groups had different preferences for schooling. A growing 
share of people at primary and secondary activities vis-à-vis those in the tertiary sector (the 
omitted category) seem to have dampened the support for public schooling. Given the 
incipient development of manufacturing and the preeminence of agricultural labour during 
most of the period, a widespread perception about the negligible advantages of acquiring 
more skills to perform these activities and the high opportunity costs of leaving the jobs to 
attend schools would account for this result. 
 
A final driver of the schooling provision is the ratio of children respect to the elderly. The 
coefficient shows a strong association between school provision and the presence of younger 
population, indicating that the generational conflict over resources was not visible during the 
years under analysis.  
 
One important distinction suggested by the historical literature refers to the peculiar 
dynamics that featured the years 1917 to 1931. As already noted, there was a significant 
increase in public education spending during this period (particularly from 1924 to 1930). 
Besides, the level of party fragmentation was not so pervasive and deep as it would become 
later. On account of these facts, is it possible that the political factors acted differently before 
and after 1931? In order to identify any changing pattern, a dummy variable for this period 
has been interacted with the political variables. Results are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Political determinants of primary schooling by period 
Dep. Var.: Nº of public schools 1 2 3 4 5  
Effective Nº of Fractions (ENF)  0.895** 1.013*** 0.816** 0.805** 0.590 
 
(0.381) (0.315) (0.363) (0.364) (0.401) 
ENF x period 1917-1931 0.259 -0.119 0.308 0.264 0.207 
 
(0.624) (0.547) (0.533) (0.595) (0.731) 
Government Seat Margin (GSM) 
 
-2.974**  
 
 
  
(1.060)  
 
 
GSM x period 1917-1931 
 
3.600***  
 
 
  
(1.102)  
 
 
Gov. Political Power Index (GPPI)  
 
 -3.374* 
 
 
  
 (1.686) 
 
 
GPII x period 1917-1931 
 
 4.041* 
 
 
  
 (2.114) 
 
 
Alignment with President 
 
  -2.873**  
  
  (1.065)  
Align. Pres. x period 1917-1931 
 
  4.679*  
  
  (2.574)  
Vote Margin (VM)     -0.883 
     (4.776) 
VM x period 1917-1931     8.039 
 
    (5.637) 
Gov. held prov. x period 1917-1931     0.305 
 
    (1.966) 
Vm xGov. held prov. x per. 1917-1931     22.085* 
     (11.296) 
Gov. held prov. (dummy)      -2.048** 
 
    (0.937) 
Land Gini index -39.656** -47.362*** -45.774*** -45.920*** -47.330*** 
 (15.099) (12.920) (13.481) (15.197) (12.920) 
Potential Electorate 18.494* 15.106** 16.392* 18.537** 15.333 
 (9.174) (7.135) (8.175) (8.673) (19.493) 
Population (thousands) 0.782*** 0.755*** 0.775*** 0.783*** 0.614*** 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.117) (0.118) (0.142) 
Birth rate (per thousands) 0.192** 0.210*** 0.206** 0.192** 0.091 
 (0.082) (0.069) (0.077) (0.081) (0.075) 
Primary enroll.(lag. 1) 39.931** 43.239** 40.409** 41.127** 29.844* 
(15.418) (15.066) (15.427) (15.514) (14.294) 
Priv. school stud./total (lag 1) -43.627*** -40.980** -40.750** -43.087*** -41.581** 
(14.832) (16.183) (15.671) (14.653) (16.448) 
Secondary enroll. (lag. 6) -59.409* -47.640 -51.975 -50.413 -12.883 
(33.114) (27.879) (30.271) (30.098) (33.780) 
Labour force participation rate 82.928*** 74.507*** 79.060*** 80.658*** 59.219** 
 (19.256) (18.383) (18.751) (19.128) (24.999) 
Rate of growth of tertiary labourers 876.580** 749.158** 845.693** 878.337** 294.846 
 (312.948) (320.985) (334.089) (321.390) (393.749) 
Active pop. in prim. activities/total -328.592*** -312.916*** -308.434*** -321.047*** -264.128** 
 (105.017) (107.959) (105.713) (104.076) (92.693) 
Active pop. in sec. activities/total -336.444*** -327.266** -316.626** -331.511** -273.319** 
 (112.352) (123.937) (115.223) (114.909) (129.040) 
School aged /people over 55 20.909*** 21.265*** 20.727*** 21.798*** 6.946*** 
 (5.284) (5.055) (5.344) (4.915) (2.112) 
Observations 551 548 549 551 443 
R2 0.603 0.621 0.624 0.609 0.712 
Note: All columns include department and time fixed effects and a constant. A total of 18 departments are 
considered. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Columns 1 to 4 show that with the exception of the effect of NEF, which does not seem to vary 
between periods, the influence of other political variables was positive and significant before 
1931 (the effect is obtained from adding the coefficients of the non-interacted and interacted 
political variables). Furthermore, in the case of vote margins and government held 
departments, the effect also becomes positive. This means that during this first sub-period, 
governments would have privileged those districts where they were politically stronger, that 
is where it obtained larger positive electoral margins and where its own legislators prevailed.  
 
Finally, Table 6 explores whether the relationship between political factors and school 
expansion remains robust when the sample is divided between the rich and middle-income 
departments and the poor periphery (as described in Section 2). Columns 1 to 6 show that 
though the direction of the estimated effects does not bear differences with the baseline 
regressions, they seem to be stronger in the least developed departments. Besides, as 
previously found, government power measured by the seat margin during 1917-1931 
privileged a core- supporter oriented strategy, a trend visible in both groups of departments 
(Columns 7 and 8). So far, the table suggests a revealing pattern: incumbent’s political 
persuasion seems to have acted with more intensity in departments where public funds were 
probably more needed. 
 
The effects of control variables are similar to the baseline tables, although the land Gini index 
is only significant in the rich and middle-income department sample. Thus, in poorer regions, 
craving for funds, land inequality would not have been so crucial to drive the resource 
distribution from central government.20  
                                                          
20 The few available observations for the periphery (given that there are no data for 3 electoral 
instances and this group is the smallest) prevented a robust computation of the vote margin effect.  
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      Table 6. Political determinants of schooling provision by economic development of departments  
Dep. Var.:  Nº of public schools 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Periphery  
dep. 
Richer  
dep. 
Periphery  
dep. 
Richer  
dep. 
Periphery  
dep. 
Richer  
dep. 
Periphery  
dep. 
Richer  
dep. 
Effective Nº of Fractions (ENF) 0.976** 1.149** 0.962** 0.998* 0.763* 1.041** 1.425* 1.046* 
 
(0.340) (0.433) (0.328) (0.466) (0.312) (0.456) (0.626) (0.531) 
ENF x period 1917-1931 
      
-0.510 -0.055 
       
(0.904) (0.671) 
Government Seat Margin (GSM) -0.935 -1.398 
    
-2.199* -3.006* 
 
(0.582) (0.973) 
    
(0.994) (1.425) 
GSM x period 1917-1931 
      
2.378** 3.253* 
       
(0.855) (1.559) 
Gov. Political Power Index (GPPI)  
  
-2.088** -1.935 
    
   
(0.791) (1.861) 
    Alignment with President 
    
-2.054* -0.036 
  
     
(0.987) (1.103) 
  Land Gini index -2.148 -42.470** -5.405 -44.339** -5.103 -42.297** -7.110 -49.394** 
 
(18.824) (16.177) (18.732) (15.311) (17.367) (15.965) (16.974) (17.132) 
Other control vars. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 179 369 180 369 182 369 179 369 
Number of departments 6 12 6 12 6 12 6 12 
R2 0.300 0.437 0.310 0.430 0.320 0.439 0.321 0.375 
Note: All columns include department and time fixed effects and a constant. All regressions include electorate, population, birth rate, primary 
enrolment rates, private/public school students, secondary enrolment rates, labour force participation, growth rate of tertiary labour, active 
population in primary and secondary activities over total and school aged people over 55.  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Some robustness checks of the baseline results are presented in the next tables. In Table 7, the 
dependent variable is replaced by the number of teachers in public schools. This indicator works as 
a proxy for current public spending. The estimation results suggest that this variable was also 
affected by political factors. Except for estimates in Column 4, the coefficients show that a greater 
political fragmentation favoured teacher hiring. In Columns 1-3 higher government’s legislative 
power is negatively related to the number of teachers, though the coefficient on alignment in 
Column 3 is not statistically significant. The estimates in Column 4 render non significant results for 
the vote margin approach. Finally, controlling for the impacts of the political variables over sub-
periods the results in Column 5 contrast with those obtained in Table 5. Now, the interaction of the 
incumbent seat margin variable with the first sub-period (1917-1930) has the same net effect as the 
one found for the entire period. That is, the prevailing government orientation has been to persuade 
opposition or less “safe” provincial legislators. The result is the same when using the GPII variable.  
 
Note that land inequality across departments has tended to decrease the teaching availability (the 
variable has the expected negative sign). However, the coefficient is not always statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
  
31 
 
 
Table 7. Number of teachers as dependent variable 
Dep. Var: Nº teachers in public 
schools 
1 2 3 4 5 
Effective Nº Fractions (ENF)  2.109** 1.462* 1.603** 0.286 2.274** 
 
(0.801) (0.748) (0.723) (0.779) (0.933) 
Government Seat Margin (GSM) -5.311**  
 
 -8.002*** 
 
(1.959)  
 
 (2.458) 
Government Political Power Index   -4.950* 
 
  
 
 (2.859) 
 
  
Alignment with President   -2.334   
   (3.384)   
Vote Margin   
 
13.886  
   
 
(14.004)  
Vote Margin x Gov. held prov 
(dummy) 
  
 
-11.119  
   
 
(15.002)  
Gov. held prov. (dummy)   
 
-5.283  
   
 
(3.381)  
GSM  x per. 17-31   
 
 6.167** 
   
 
 (2.870) 
Land Gini Index -67.198 -73.162* -66.583 -77.394* -77.302 
 (43.993) (43.698) (43.421) (40.533) (48.373) 
Other control vars. YES YES YES YES  
Observations 547 548 550 442 547 
R2 0.774 0.773 0.770 0.773 0.774 
Note: All columns include department and time fixed effects and a constant. All regressions include electorate, population, 
birth rate, primary enrolment rates, private/public school students, secondary enrolment rates, labour force participation, 
growth rate of tertiary labour, active population in primary and secondary activities over total and school aged people 
over 55. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 8 presents a first difference estimation. Similar to the fixed effects (FE) method, it eliminates 
all unobserved effects correlated with observed variables across departments. However, the 
assumption in FE is that errors are not serially correlated, while the first difference estimation let 
them assume a random walk process (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The estimations show how the 
number of schools has changed over time in response to changes in the independent variables. In 
Columns 1-3 first difference is applied to the annual dataset while in Columns 4-7 regressions have 
been computed at the legislative term level. The results mirror the findings in Table 4 in terms of 
the direction of the influence they describe. The estimation strategy provides significant and 
negative coefficients for the incidence of land inequality when applied to the legislative-term 
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dataset. However, the year to year variation for annual data does not provide variation enough to 
obtain statistically significant coefficients.  
 
Table 8 First difference estimation of determinants of public schooling provision 
Dep. Var. Nº of Public Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 
D. ENF  0.515* 0.466* 0.430 0.358* 0.339* 0.411** 
 
(0.267) (0.259) (0.254) (0.175) (0.167) (0.159) 
D. Gov. Seat Margin -0.535** 
  
-0.929 
  
 
(0.234) 
  
(0.782) 
  D. GPPI  
 
-0.412 
  
-1.279** 
 
  
(0.525) 
  
(0.457) 
 D. Alignment with President  
  
-1.119*** 
  
-0.134 
   
(0.322) 
  
(0.421) 
D. Land Gini Index  -0.859 0.245 -2.538 -22.812*** -23.558*** -20.257** 
 
(7.293) (7.013) (7.116) (7.394) (7.540) (7.565) 
Other control vars.  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 550 546 546 180 180 180 
Dataset  Annual Annual Annual Legis. term Legis. term Legis. term 
R2 0.366 0.361 0.357 0.783 0.784 0.781 
Note: All columns include department and time fixed effects and a constant. All regressions include electorate, 
population, birth rate, primary enrolment rates, private/public school students, secondary enrolment rates, labour 
force participation, growth rate of tertiary labour, active population in primary and secondary activities over total and 
school aged people over 55. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To sum up, the results show that for the whole period the incumbent government tended to look to 
swing voter districts and opposition legislators to allocate public school funds. This rationale 
seemed to hide two distinct patterns when analyzing the school provision though it does not emerge 
so clear when considering teaching hiring (proxy of current expenditure) over time. Until the 1930s 
government would have targeted education spending to its core constituencies and to regions 
dominated by legislators from its own party. However, particularly after 1938, the tactics shifted 
and the departments more likely to receive education funds, all else equal, were those far apart from 
the president’s party or with higher levels of electoral dispute. In addition, the effect of a closer race 
in the last election or of legislative bargains with the opposition seemed to have conducted pork 
barrel politics particularly in poorer regions.  
6. Conclusions 
 
The initial expansion of primary schooling system is largely a government outcome. Taking the 
Uruguayan case, this study explores the presence of tactical incentives in the allocation of primary 
schooling funds at the department level during the period 1914-1954. Drawing on the “distributive 
33 
 
politics” literature, it proposes an empirical approach based on indicators about party and electoral 
competition. To this end, a particular dataset combining historical information about school 
provision, electoral and political results have been compiled.  
 
Despite its size, Uruguay is an upper-middle income country that has been a regional pioneer in 
terms of social and economic development, and in the establishment of solid democratic rules. In 
this setting, the case of an interference of politics in the diffusion of primary schooling becomes a 
reasonable concern given the strong partisan biases of local policy-making during the period and 
the manipulation of public resources in response to electoral competition found by the previous 
literature.  
 
The main finding of the study suggests that political factors have played a relevant role in schooling 
provision across the territory. Influences have come from all the different indicators applied: the 
level of party-fragmentation, the legislative bargaining process and electoral dispute. This result 
contends the historical literature claiming that, unlike other matters of social policy, education was 
not affected by political strategies. Instead, politics seems to have had a distinct impact on the 
government commitment to fund basic education.  
 
Interestingly, though the incumbent government would have kept a tactical resource allocation 
throughout the period, the direction of the influence shifted over time. During a first phase, school 
provision appears as more correlated to core voters and government’s party legislators. That is, 
during the period of political stability and education budget expansion that preceded the economic 
and political crisis of the 1930s, funds were allocated to departments where voters were clearly 
attached to the incumbent party (core supporters). However, from 1934 to 1954 the most favoured 
regions have been identified with the procurement of legislative support from opposition or from 
swing voter departments. This coincides with times of higher political conflict and bargaining. The 
opposition reward strategy also seemed to have been more intense in the less developed regions. 
 
Landownership inequality, together with the effect of variables associated to the extant levels of 
education and wealth, adversely affected school provision. Meanwhile, widespread of political voice, 
the size of population and the importance of tertiary activities in the labour market favoured its 
expansion. In contrast to the received wisdom, these results reinforce the idea that public school 
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funds at the local level were not evenly distributed following purely children age requirements or 
the directives of a complete altruistic government.  
 
To be sure, many education policy and budget constraint aspects (not discussed here) might have 
been pivotal to explain the disappointing primary schooling results by the 1960s (CIDE, 1965; 
Otero, 1969) and the low quality and educational attainments in upper education levels by the end 
of the 20th century (Hanushek and Woessman, 2012; Aedo and Walker, 2012). Indeed, it has been 
posed that Latin American countries (including Uruguay) have overcommitted funds to tertiary 
schooling at the expense of primary education, thus slowing down the achievement of school 
completion in the first cycle as well as knowledge acquisition goals (Frankema, 2009; Lindert, 
2010). In addition to this established literature, this study drives the attention to the effects of pork 
barrel politics. The extent up to which funding decisions have been affected by political tactics might 
well have contributed to a suboptimal provision of basic education. So much worse given that this 
political agenda appeared to have hit harder on the poorer regions, which were in greatest need of 
public compensating mechanisms.  
 
Being mass education one of the most relevant engines of development, it is possible that political 
strategies might have compromised the role of schooling to alleviate persisting territorial 
inequalities and to gear economic growth. Hence, by introducing a stance on early schooling linked 
to partisan politics, this paper provides evidence complementing the ongoing research lines on 
regional development disparities in the country and raise new questions on the historical roots of 
Latin American backwardness.  
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Appendix 
Tabla A.1 Data sources 
Variables (department level) Data sources 
Nº of schools (private and public)  MEC, Ministerio de Educación y Cultura. 2014. 140 años de la 
educación del pueblo: aportes para la reflexión sobre la educación 
en Uruguay. Tomo I. MEC, Montevideo.  
DGEa- Dirección General Estadísticas, (various years). National 
Statistics Yearbook, Montevideo 
Nº of teachers (private and public)  
Enrolment in primary schools  
(public and private)  
Enrolment in secondary institutions  
(public and private)  
Births per department 
  
Parliament representatives  
by party and fraction 
Asamblea General. 2006. Parlamentarios uruguayos 1830-2005, 
Montevideo. 
CEU- Corte Electoral Uruguay. Data retrieved from 
http://www.corteelectoral.gub.uy/historial hojas de votación. 
Acevedo, E.1934; 1936. Anales Históricos del Uruguay. Tomo V 
and VI. Casa Barreiro y Ramos, Montevideo. 
FSS-Faculty of Social Sciences Databank. Data retrieved from 
http://cienciassociales.edu.uy/bancosdedatos. 
Nahum, B. (coord). 2007. Estadísticas Históricas del Uruguay 
1900-1950. Tomo I. Departamento de Publicaciones, Universidad 
de la República, Montevideo. 
Nohlen, D. 1993. Enciclopedia electoral latinoamericana y del 
Caribe. Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, San José 
de Costa Rica. 
Votes casts and electorate 
  
Total Population  DGEb- Dirección General de Estadística. Population and Household 
Census 1908 and 1963. 
Nahum, B. (coord). 2007. Estadísticas Históricas del Uruguay 
1900-1950. Tomo I. Departamento de Publicaciones, Universidad 
de la República, Montevideo. 
 
Population by age bracket 
Gini Land Index Castro, P., Pradines, V. and Riestra, V. 2012. Los determinantes del 
precio de la tierra en el largo plazo. Thesis dissertation. Facultad 
de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración, Universidad de la 
República, Montevideo..  
  
Population by economic activity García, M., Martínez, J. and Willebald, H. 2015. Crecimiento y 
estructura productiva regional en Uruguay en la primera mitad del 
siglo XX. Serie Documentos de Trabajo. Instituto de Economía.. 
Universidad de la República, Uruguay 
Martínez, J., Rodríguez, A. and Willebald, H. 2015. Regional income 
inequality in Uruguay during a century. Paper presented in the 
XVIIth World Economic History Congress “Diversity and 
Development”, Kyoto. 
Labour force participation  
  
Public primary education  
expenditure (countries)  
UC Davis. Global price and income history group. Data retrieved 
from http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Government.htm. 
Total schooling years (countries)  Lee, J. and Lee, H. 2016. Human Capital in the Long Run. Journal of 
Development Economics 122: 147-169.  
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Table A.2. Descriptive variables  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Nº of public schools overall 68 25.31 21 168 N =     738 
 between  21.47 30 128 n =      18 
 within  14.31 25 108 T =      41 
Nº of teachers in public schools overall 152 78.90 35 483 N =     737 
 between  51.08 67 300 n =      18 
 within  61.28 -23 335 T-bar = 40.9 
Effective Nº Political Fractions (ENF) overall 2.39 0.80 1.00 6.00 N =     738 
 between  0.37 1.81 3.12 n =      18 
 within  0.71 0.85 5.27 T =      41 
Alignment with President overall 0.54 0.32 0.00 1.00 N =     738 
 between  0.05 0.45 0.68 n =      18 
 within  0.31 -0.13 1.09 T =      41 
Government Political Power Index overall 0.21 0.22 0.00 1.00 N =     736 
(GPPI) between  0.09 0.08 0.50 n =      18 
 within  0.20 -0.29 1.04 T-bar = 40.8 
Government Seat Margin overall 0.09 0.42 -1.00 1.00 N =     735 
 between  0.26 -0.32 0.61 n =      18 
 within  0.33 -1.02 1.29 T-bar = 40.8 
Vote margin overall 0.16 0.12 0.003 0.60 N =     574 
 between  0.082 0.057 0.35 n =      18 
 within  0.093 -0.023 0.50 T = 31.8 
Potential Electorate overall 0.38 0.21 0.02 2.22 N =     738 
 between  0.03 0.32 0.43 n =      18 
 within  0.21 -0.01 2.17 T =      41 
Population (thousands) overall 77.78 32.55 12.44 210.32 N =     738 
 between  29.66 30.38 165.40 n =      18 
 within  15.08 -75.18 122.69 T =      41 
School aged /people over 55 overall 2.37 0.83 0.90 5.25 N =     738 
 between  0.51 1.82 3.48 n =      18 
 within  0.66 1.16 4.24 T =      41 
Land Gini index overall 0.69 0.14 0.16 0.84 N =     666 
 between  0.14 0.22 0.81 n =      18 
 within  0.02 0.60 0.75 T =      37 
Birth rate (per thousands) overall 22.10 10.25 8.84 259.04 N =     738 
 between  2.12 18.60 26.52 n =      18 
 within  10.04 9.88 256.63 T =      41 
Private school students/total overall 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.20 N =     702 
 between  0.04 0.01 0.14 n =      18 
 within  0.02 0.01 0.16 T =      39 
Secondary enrolment overall 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.14 N =     644 
 between  0.01 0.02 0.05 n =      18 
 within  0.02 0.00 0.14 T = 35.7 
Primary enrolment rate overall 0.38 0.09 0.20 0.70 N =     738 
 between  0.04 0.33 0.48 n =      18 
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Variable (cont.)  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Primary enrolment rate overall 0.38 0.09 0.20 0.70 N =     738 
 between  0.04 0.33 0.48 n =      18 
 within  0.09 0.22 0.63 T =      41 
Active population in primary overall 0.44 0.07 0.23 0.60 N =     738 
activities/total between  0.05 0.33 0.52 n =      18 
 within  0.04 0.32 0.61 T =      41 
Active population in secondary overall 0.22 0.04 0.15 0.33 N =     738 
activities/total between  0.04 0.17 0.29 n =      18 
 within  0.01 0.17 0.27 T =      41 
Labour force participation rate overall 0.40 0.08 0.25 0.60 N =     738 
 between  0.06 0.32 0.55 n =      18 
 within  0.05 0.28 0.57 T =      41 
Rate of growth of tertiary labourers overall 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 N =     738 
 between  0.01 0.01 0.04 n =      18 
 within  0.01 0.00 0.06 T =      41 
Source: Tabla A.1 
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